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Abstract 
When the financial crisis hit the Eurozone, Belgium, along with several other countries, 
postponed its consolidation policies until after the general elections. What followed was the 
longest caretaker rule that any stable democracy had ever experienced. This article analyses 
the phenomenon of policy continuity and change during this double crisis. It illustrates how 
the exogenous economic crisis overrode the endogenous political crisis, showing  the extent 
to which international policy determinants expanded the remit of caretaker policy-making. At 
the same time, our analysis of the nature of caretaker conventions, the nature of multi-level 
governance, the permanence of administrative personnel, and the re-invention of parliament 
offers opportunities to draw lessons and deepen comparative research on policy termination 
and maintenance in the face of crisis.  
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Introduction 
In 2011, Belgium made it into the Guinness World Records for the longest period a country 
governed without an elected government in peacetime. While prolonged government 
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formation is not uncommon in consociationalist countries such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Van Aelst and Louwerse 2014: 492), the coalition negotiations of 2010-11 in 
Belgium lasted unprecedentedly long. It took no less than 541 days before a full-powered 
government was established. Moreover, its functioning took place during one of the deepest 
global financial crises in decades. The coincidence of an endogenous political crisis with an 
exogenous financial crisis provides an interesting research background for comparative 
policy analysis. Theories may speculate about what happens to policy-making when one level 
of government fails, the Belgian experiment reveals what actually happens in this situation.  
In this contribution, we attempt to decode this exceptional case of policy continuity 
and change in times of crisis in the language of comparative policy analysis, using concepts 
of policy change. Our analysis of policy change on a continuum of policy termination and 
innovation demonstrates how the financial crisis challenged the caretaker government’s 
disposition towards preserving the status quo, thus imposing a mandate for change upon a 
government whose mandate it was to have as little change as possible. It illustrates the reach 
of international determinants of policy-making, even into the heart of domestic democratic 
breaks on policy change. At the same time, our analysis highlights how the nature of multi-
level governance, the characteristics of the civil service system, and the re-constellation of 
parliamentary veto-players amalgamated into a set of conditions that were conducive in 
ensuring that necessary policy measures were adopted to stave off system failure. These 
conditions provide grounds for comparative lesson-drawing.  
The article starts with a section on the case study and method, after which we discuss 
the theoretical concepts that informed the description and explanation of policy continuity 
and change under caretaker rule. In the actual analysis, we firstly describe the size of the 
endogenous political and the exogenous global crisis that hit Belgium in the period 2010-
2011. Next, we discuss policy change during caretaker-rule on a continuum between policy 
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termination and innovation. We further attempt to explain the drivers of change, by analysing 
three particular conditions: the role played by other levels of government, the importance of 
continuity of political and administrative personnel, and the re-invention of Parliament. The 
article concludes with lessons from the Belgian case and some directions for further research. 
 
Case study and methods 
 
In his article ‘Consociationalism, corruption and chocolate: Belgian exceptionalism’, 
Guy Peters (2006) emphasised the singularity of Belgium as a locus for comparative research. 
According to Peters, Belgium is a particularly interesting case for understanding the capacity 
to govern, given the many barriers that exist to limit that capacity. ‘The expected outcomes 
from a federal system in which the choices being made are politicized very strongly, and in 
which preferences for different types of services are also markedly different, are the lowest 
common denominator, or no decision at all….’ Yet, Peters found that the ‘Belgian political 
system appears capable of making those decisions’ (1085). Faced with its longest political 
gridlock ever during a time of financial meltdown in the Eurozone, the Belgium vacant 
government situation presented the international media and scholarly community with a 
quandary of understanding how Belgian policy-making produced an equilibrium between 
policy continuity and change. 
Much like Peters’ coalescence of factors that described Belgium’s policy-making in 
normal times, we set out to identify the factors that combine to explain policy-making in 
abnormal times. At a time and situation which seemed least likely to produce any policy 
outcomes at all, given the prolonged absence of a full-fledged government, and the restraints 
imposed by caretaker conventions, the caretaker government maintained the policy status quo 
as well as effected policy changes of varying degrees. What are the factors that produced 
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policy continuity and change at a time when government failure was not easily remedied by 
the usual comity in which party elites engage? In answering this question, this article seeks to 
decipher this unique case in the language of comparative policy analysis.  
 
Our study is a qualitative single case study. Single cases are justified when dealing 
with ‘complex and relatively unstructured and infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of 
the subfield’ (Bennett and Elman 2007: 171). Studying policy continuity and change is 
complex, and given the duration of the crisis policy-makers faced, the case we study is also 
unprecedented. Equally, we argue that issues like policy continuity and change lie at the heart 
of comparative policy analysis, and align with empirical and normative concerns about 
effective governance. 
Our case study does not derive from a formal research design, but from an attempt of 
three sympathetic observers to deconstruct the unique Belgian puzzle that faced the 
international community of policy scholars. Our case was thus primarily, as Stake says 
‘defined by interest in an individual case, not by the methods of inquiry used’ (2003: 134). 
Leaving aside an orthodox variable oriented approach, and a rigorous test of a set of theories, 
we used a qualitative case study to provide a nuanced and holistic account of a specific 
phenomenon. This is not to say that we just let the facts speak to us or that our account is a-
theoretical (see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2009: 190-192). Rather, we argue that our case study is 
theory-informed and implicitly comparative (Bennett and Elman 2008: 505-506).  
This contribution relies upon exclusive data material, collected during and until 18 
months after Belgium’s prolonged caretaker rule. In addition to document analysis of legal 
texts, parliamentary proceedings and newspaper reports, input was collected via semi-
structured interviews with privileged informants. Two interview rounds were organized: one 
during the period of caretaker government in May/June 2011, with six elite respondents; and 
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one during the subsequent full government, in March/April 2013, with four elite respondents. 
The same three interviewees were questioned in both rounds. Interviews lasted between two 
and three hours. We interviewed elites from the administration (Inspectorate of Finance, 
Ministry of Social Affairs), from the political arena (a party leader with a prominent role in 
the government formation negotiations, and political advisors from the ministerial cabinets of 
the Minister of Economics, the Minister of Pensions, and of the Treasurer), and from the 
media (one of the most prominent political observers). Together, our respondents provided a 
fulsome inside perspective on policy making in crisis times, allowing for a triangulation of 
evidence and a critical check upon accepted narratives in media and politics. In our questions 
we inquired about the nature and impact of policy continuity and change generally and 
specific to certain policy domains. Moreover, we inquired about the configuration of 
institutional and actor related factors producing continuity and change.  
 
Theoretical concepts and lenses 
As mentioned above, our case study is theoretically informed and implicitly 
comparative. Theoretical concepts serve as inputs for our case description of policy-making 
under caretaker rule. We equally draw upon several bodies of literature and empirical 
research to explain the configuration of conditions that were conducive to the kind of policy 
continuity and change produced under caretaker rule. We further contend that several of our 
findings are relevant for comparative lesson-drawing, particularly so for the design of 
caretaker conventions, but equally speaking to multi-level government designs and the 
definition of roles and procedures for the administration. In support of analytical descriptions 
and the search for explanations, we turn to literature on the nature and consequences of 
caretaker government, theories on types and drivers of policy continuity and change, and 
research on policy-making in multi-level government.  
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Caretaker government conventions 
The literature on caretaker governments is scarce and only recently has there been an 
uptake in comparative research and lesson-drawing on the nature of caretaker conventions 
(Mcdonnell and Valbruzzi 2014; Schleiter and Belu 2015). Three distinctions are relevant for 
our analysis. The first distinction emerging from the literature is one between a caretaker 
government and a technocratic government. Technocratic governments have a mandate for 
change, whereas the remit of caretaker governments is explicitly limited. During the financial 
crisis several countries in the Eurozone were governed by technocratic governments to push 
through major policy changes (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). Belgium was ruled by a 
caretaker government and not a technocratic government, and its scope for policy change was 
limited. A second distinction reminds (Schleiter and Belu 2015: 229) us that the type of 
caretaker period we study is the one between a general election and the formation of a new 
government, and not the periods from parliament’s dissolution to a general election, or when 
an incumbent government loses a confidence motion. The third pertinent distinction clarifies 
the nature of caretaker government conventions as both the enablers of policy continuity and 
the barriers to policy change. (Schleiter and Belu 2015: 231-2, referring to Laver and 
Schepsle 1994) point out that comparative caretaker conventions have converged on two 
main principles. The first principle argues that caretaker governments are not predisposed to 
resignation as they reign to ensure that a country is never without a functioning executive. 
The second, principle is that caretaker governments restrict themselves to preserving the 
‘policy status quo’ (Laver and Schepsle 1994: 292, quoted in Schleiter and Belu 2015: 231), 
thus abstaining from decisions that inappropriately burden the incoming government. The 
first principle guarantees policy continuity in matters that were in place when the outgoing 
government lost its parliamentary basis, the second principle rules out new initiatives. 
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Schleiter and Belu (2015: 231) further clarify that when caretaker periods are short, 
caretakers can simply defer significant decisions until the next government takes over. When 
caretaker periods are prolonged, situations will arise in which decisions ‘cannot simply be 
deferred (231-232)’ and thus policy change is necessitated. While this is not the case for all 
variants of caretaker conventions, the Belgian conventions allow for urgent matters to be 
attended to. 
What is deemed major policy initiatives and urgent matters is not always clear-cut in 
caretaker conventions. Rules as institutions are not cast in stone and will be up for 
interpretation when situations and actors combine to challenge them. We will argue that this 
is exactly what happened: the exceptionally long duration of the caretaker government, 
together with the financial crisis and the configuration of actors relaxed Belgium’s caretaker 
conventions to the extent they facilitated policy change.  
 
Nature and drivers of policy change 
 
While the literature on caretaker governments is scarce, that on policy change is rife with 
useful concepts to describe and interpret policy continuity and change under caretaker 
governments. From the perspective of Hogwood and Peters’ (1983) policy dynamics, Belgian 
caretaker government conventions prevent policy termination, allow for maintenance and 
constrain innovation. In Hall’s terms (1993), the accepted preservation of the status quo gives 
room for routine adjustments to existing policies (first order changes). Also second order 
changes should in principle be possible, when policy instruments are altered to achieve the 
set goals of the outgoing government. But third order changes, which would shift policy goals 
are clearly at odds with caretaker principles. In our analysis, we will to some extent draw 
upon these types of change to understand the decisions for routinely preserving the status quo 
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as well as slight and substantial alterations. But we agree with Pollitt and Bouckaert (2009: 7) 
that grading particular policy changes as ‘‘big’ or ‘small’, or ‘paradigmatic’ or ‘incremental’ 
is ultimately a matter of judgment by observers’,.. ‘as there is an inescapably socially 
constructed dimension to policy change’. Our qualitative description and interpretation 
indicate whether or not policy decisions did or did not agree with policy continuity under 
caretaker rule.  
Next to offering us the analytical language for describing and qualifying policy change, the 
literature also suggests a number of candidates for explaining the kind of policy changes we 
observe. In normal times, policy-making in Belgium has traditionally been described as 
incremental, due to the presence of many veto-players. In some domains, however, the 
succession of incremental changes has been understood to combine to equate to substantial 
policy alteration in time. The Belgian state’s gradual transformation from a unitary into a 
federal state is a case in point.  
Also the much acclaimed and widely applied punctuated equilibrium theory of Baumgartner 
and Jones (1993) has found resonance in research on policy-making in Belgium. In their 
study of Belgian policy agendas, Walgrave and Vliegenthart (2010) found evidence of 
friction (next to cascading). We will argue that friction and delayed error correction can also 
explain the more substantial policy changes that were instigated under caretaker rule, 
particularly when we combine these concepts with Birkland’s concept of focusing events 
(1998) as did Walgrave and Varone (2008) in their article on policy change following the 
Dutroux scandal in Belgium. In our analysis, we will show how caretaker conventions kept 
policies stagnant and thus provided an institutional barrier to policy change, rather than a 
cognitive one that is often called in to explain stasis. We will also demonstrate how the 
financial crisis, as a focusing event, together with pressures from Europe managed to lift this 
institutional barrier to facilitate error correction.  
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Moving away from the center of government 
 
Guy Peters claims (KU Leuven, 03.02.2015) that when government fails, analysts tend to 
keep a narrow focus on the center of government and thus may be blinded for the 
reconfiguration of actors who might or might not contribute to effective governance. Moving 
away from the center of government, our inductive analysis of agents of continuity and 
change during caretaker government points at the reinvention of parliamentary actors as well 
as at the role of the administration and other levels of government. The literature on 
parliamentary-executive relations provides us with the concepts to describe the reassertion of 
parliamentary actors as a temporary move away from the moderately weak parliamentary 
rubberstamping tradition (Deschouwer 2009; Van Aelst and Louwerse 2014). Otherwise 
docile MPs became active agents in legislative policy change. Research on politico-
administrative relations (Brans et al. 2016) in turn helps us to clarify how the permanent civil 
service ‘served’ as the de facto guardian of policy continuity and intervener in policy changes 
at the level of implementation, an often forgotten site of policy change. Finally, explaining 
continuity and change under caretaker rule requires a consideration of other levels of 
government. Yet, this is complex to outline. We will show that the kind of bipolar centrifugal 
multi-level-government arrangement (Brans et al. 2009) within Belgium can paradoxically 
account for both the length of the governing crisis and the mitigation of its negative 
consequences. The success of the Belgian Presidency of the EU under caretaker rule in turn 
cannot be explained without reference to the kind of collaborative federalism in which 
otherwise competitive regional and federal administrations interact within the European 
policy-space (Beyers and Bursens 2006). 
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Endogenous and Exogenous Crises Combined  
Endogenous political crisis 
In 2006, Peters (1088) saw two signs of the political crisis that was to embroil Belgium later 
that decade. The strength of Flemish Nationalist parties and the divergence of party systems 
in the two segments of the country were ‘reducing the degree of symmetry and compatibility 
among coalitions ruling at the different levels’ of government (De Winter et al. 2006). The 
June 2010 federal elections indeed resulted in a very fragmented party landscape, with twelve 
parties gaining representation in the federal parliament. On each side of the language border, 
a clear winner nonetheless emerged. On the Francophone side, the Socialist Party gained 
37.6% of the votes (Chamber of Representatives). On the Flemish side, the conservative 
Flemish Nationalist Party (N-VA) was the uncontested winner, with 27.8% of the votes. The 
power balances between the regions not only radically changed, but also existing divergent 
trends were strengthened. Ideologically, the party system in Flanders is dominated by right-
wing political actors, whereas at the French speaking side, left wing political priorities 
reigned (Abts et al. 2012). 
These discrepancies were reflected in conflicting oppositions between the winning 
parties on major issues in the coalition negotiations. First, the parties clashed on the 
constitutional reform of the Belgian federal state, including the electoral redistricting of a 
bilingual constituency and the revision of the financing of the communities, regions and 
federation. Second, the classic left-right divide at the negotiation table prevented agreement 
on pressing socio-economic issues, such as work and pensions. The Flemish nationalist N-
VA eventually left the negotiation process in disagreement with the ultimate draft agreement, 
which eight other parties had agreed to (Abts et al. 2012). 
 During this long political crisis, an official, fully mandated government was absent. 
In parallel of the caretaker government, political party leaders were involved in lengthy 
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negotiations, whilst behaving as a constituent government, paving the way for a new 
constitutional setting of the Belgian institutional architecture. In our analysis, we focus on the 
caretaker government, or the government of ‘current affairs’, as it is called in Belgium, rather 
than on the emergent constituent government. 
 
Exogenous financial crisis 
The political gridlock in Belgium coincided with the financial crisis in the Eurozone. 
Belgium suffered significantly, as is evidenced by three economic indicators (see Stroobants 
et al. 2013). 
First, the debt level reached almost 100% of the GDP. Problems in the banking sector 
demanded public interventions, and operations to stabilize the financial system, contributing 
further to this high debt level. This made the Belgian public sector extremely vulnerable to 
market pressure. A second indicator was the Belgian inflation rate, which generally followed 
the trend in the euro area. In 2010, however, Belgium reached an annual average of 2,3%, 
compared to 1,6% in the euro area. Thirdly, the 10-year interest rate was severely affected by 
the sovereign debt crisis. In November 2011, in the midst of the political crisis, the spreads 
between Belgium and the German 10-year government bonds reached no less than 366 
points. The magnitude of the financial crisis and the difficulties in the banking sector 
combined to trigger the major credit rating agencies to consecutively downgrade Belgium’s 
rating . Also the country’s political crisis was a factor in the credit rating agencies’ decisions. 
According to Standard and Poor, for instance, the caretaker government was ill-equipped to 
deal with the financial crisis (Stroobants et al. 2013: 7). 
 
Policy Termination and Innovation in Times of Dual Crisis 
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The nature of Belgian caretaker provision is such that they principally prevent both policy 
termination and policy innovation. Our analysis shows that the provisions were relaxed for 
policy change under predominantly exogenous pressures. 
 
Caretaker provisions against policy termination and innovation 
Unlike the caretaker conventions in Greece, Portugal, and Denmark (McDonnell and 
Valbruzzi 2014), existing conventions in Belgium have no foundation in the Constitution. 
They emerged from customary law, but are legally enforceable by the Supreme Court. Any 
administrative act that breaches the conventions risks being cancelled or suspended. 
As for the 2010-2011 caretaker period, the contours of the caretaker conventions were 
specified in a two-page long circular prepared by the Prime Minister’s Services and issued 
the very day the King accepted the resignation of government (26th April 2010). This circular 
was quickly followed by a second one, this time prepared by services of the Minister of 
Budget, and approved on 7th May 2010 by the Cabinet. The guidelines stipulated in both 
circulars reconcile the need for a continuity of current affairs, with the need to safeguard the 
fundamental interests of the nation.  
In view of continuity, the circulars explicitly aim to prevent policy termination, by 
requesting the uninterrupted conduct of official business. This includes the continuation of 
daily administrative management, necessary for the work of government services; the 
continuation of tutelage; and the conclusion of matters that do not require new initiatives of 
the Cabinet. Policy innovation is in principle ruled out since committing to significantly new 
initiatives is the prerogative of the incoming government.  
 Neither should the caretaker government encroach upon the incoming government’s 
right to appoint and promote public managers. Any decisions resulting in personnel changes 
were to be implemented with prudency. Except for urgent matters, appointments at the top 
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were indeed put on hold during caretaker periods. In the same spirit of safeguarding 
‘budgetary discipline and prudence regarding new expenditures’, the caretaker rules 
strengthened the administrative and budgetary control of expenditure. Expenditures that in 
full government are decided by individual ministers and public managers now needed to be 
tabled at Cabinet meetings, after having received clearance by the Inspectorate of Finance 
and the Treasury. Under caretaker rule, the thresholds for expenditures to pass through a 
more lengthy procedure of administrative and budgetary control were significantly lowered, 
and most expenditures on contracts, subsidies, and regulations were strictly tested for 
compliance with the definitions of continuous business and urgent matters. As it turned out, 
this cautionary principle on expenditures contributed to actual budgetary savings. This was a 
positive side effect, considering the financially precarious times. As for the budget, caretaker 
regulations set in place a system of what is called 'provisionary 12th's'. This system provides 
the caretaker administration with the finances to continue its business in attendance of a new 
budget: government services receive the same budgetary appropriations as they did in the 
earlier year, generally allocated per three months by special Finance Laws. These provisions 
mean that a government deadlock, or such shutdown as the one that threatened the US in 
2013, is unimaginable in the Belgian context (Hooghe, 2012).  
With regards to urgent matters, formal provisions are very limited and restricted to the 
generic stipulation that ‘urgent matters need to be tended to in a prompt way, because 
otherwise the fundamental interests of the Nation … might be at risk, or damaged’ 
(Kanselarij Eerste Minister, 2010. Own translation). Caretaker conventions are assumed to 
stay in place, as long as there is no new government duly appointed by the King. Obviously, 
at the time of issuing them, no one was able to predict they would have to apply for as long as 
541 days. As acknowledged by all our interviewees, the conciseness of the caretaker 
conventions turned out to be their major strength. Particularly given their loose description, 
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the concepts of continuity and urgency left room for discretion and interpretation, and for 
adapting to external pressures. 
 
Relaxing caretaker provisions for policy change 
As it happened, the longer the political crisis lasted, the more pressing issues became, and 
therefore required government action. International and global pressure played an important 
catalyst function in demanding policy change during the caretaker period. The most striking 
example was the Parliament voting a budget in May 2011. Having a budget approved under 
caretaker rule was thus far unseen in Belgium’s history. The vote was publicly defended as an 
attempt to restore trust vis-à-vis the financial markets and the rating bureaus. Similarly, when 
the European Commission requested the Belgian caretaker government to take measures for 
the consolidation of public finances, new initiatives were launched. Belgium exceeded the 
deficit thresholds of 3% of deficit to GDP and 60% of debt to GDP, that were imposed by the 
European Stability and Growth Pact, and anchored in the European Treaties. With some 
delay, Belgium took effective action to avert the risk of not meeting the deadlines of 2011 
and 2012 to correct its excessive deficit. The caretaker government submitted the 2011 and 
2012 Stability Programme updates to the European Commission. The stability programmes 
combined saving and revenue generating measures, such as levies from nuclear energy 
producers and from banks and revenues from curbing tax evasion. Also the 2011 and 2012 
National Reform Programmes were submitted in caretaker times (Council of the European 
Union, 2012).  
In sum, the provisions mentioned in the circulars were exploited to their full potential. 
The appointment of a new head of the National Bank is another example. Whilst not 
compatible with the accepted view on what a caretaker government should and can do, this 
appointment was framed as part of the revision of the supervision structure of the financial 
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market in reaction to the global financial crisis. Also for purely domestic matters, the 
cautionary principle was stretched. For several programmes, exceptional prolonging was 
decided. This was the case for some subsidies that expired during the caretaker period. 
Examples include subsidies for prevention workers, active in the cities, and the extension of 
contracts for scientists employed in interuniversity attraction poles, a kind of excellence 
financing. These extensions of subsidies were arguably extensions of earlier engagements, 
and thus business as usual or maintaining the status quo. However, the competences of both 
preventive city policies and science policy were possible candidates for transfer to the 
regions. This implies that extending these federal programmes under caretaker government 
was not politically neutral, and thus produced potentially contentious cases of policy change.  
There are also clear domestic cases of policy maintenance, in which new expenditure 
was allowed as an exception to better tackle earlier set goals. The Federal Service responsible 
for hosting asylum seekers, for instance, was granted the financial possibility to expand the 
room for shelter. Also within the welfare envelope, new expenses were approved, targeting 
mainly retired people and people with disabilities.  
While the caretaker provisions broadly guaranteed the continuity of policy 
programmes, considerable dead weight remained in a large range of policy domains. In 
nearly all policy domains, several decisions and implementation of policy goals and means 
experienced delays due to the long caretaker period. Concerns were raised in the media and 
Parliament with regards to decisional delays of various eGovernment projects, the funds for 
victims of medical errors, the implementation of smart checkout systems in pubs and 
restaurants to track fraud, the restructuring the emergency services, to name but a few 
examples of an extensive list. Policy maintenance by a revision of policy instrument logic 
(Howlett and Cashore 2009: 39) was neither an option in several domains. The non-take-up 
of green loans that grant beneficial interest rates and tax cuts for investments in renewable 
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energy is such an example in which the government could not calibrate the policy instruments 
to enhance effectiveness (Brans 2012).  
More fundamentally, proactive longer term policies to deal with the main challenges 
ahead could not be taken. The impact thereof was perhaps not immediately tangible during 
the caretaker period, but became more apparent 1.5 years after the new government took 
office. The list of pressing issues on the agenda of the duly installed government was long. 
True, once in power, the government promptly took important decisions about issues that had 
been left unsolved for too long. Substantial measures were taken with regard to work and 
pensions, the accelerated naturalization of immigrants, and the closure of nuclear power 
plants, to name but a few examples of policy innovation with new goals and new objectives. 
Similarly, the government succesfully proceeded with one of the biggest innovations to 
Belgium’s constitutional foundations: the sixth round of state reform. To some extent, the 
time wasted with long negotiations, was hence caught up with, and substantial policy change 
comprised major breakthroughs in tension laden issues. Yet, a lot of time and effort was 
needed still to compensate for the exceptionally long caretaker mode. At the end of May 
2013, Belgium narrowly escaped a European fine for not taking enough targeted measures for 
strengthening its public finances. Instead, it received a list of recommendations. Olli Rehn, 
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs accepted that Belgium had not 
been able to take the necessary measures in caretaker mode (European Commission, 2013). 
 
Resilience by the Nature of Multi-level Governance, Permanence of the Government 
Personnel and the Reinvention of Parliament 
 
The stretching of caretaker provisions in the face of exogenous and time pressures alone does 
not fully explain the nature of policy change during Belgium’s longest caretaker rule. It is 
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equally important to consider three conditions that were conducive in ensuring continuity and 
change. These conditions relate to the institutional actor constellations in multi-level 
governance, the permanence of government personnel, and the re-invention of what 
Zohlnhöfer (2009: 104) considers the most relevant veto-players for the analysis of policy 
change, the legislators. 
 
Multi-level governance 
Although the federal government still carries important competences, its multi-level 
governance setting, with a federal constitutional structure and a strong pro-European 
consensus (Hooghe, 2012), attenuates the risk of government shutdown, whilst at the same 
time creating opportunities for policy change. 
First, following the division of competences into a federation, the policies to be taken 
care of by a single level of government have significantly decreased. An increasing number 
of policy domains have indeed been transferred to Belgium’s regional levels. On top of this, 
it is estimated that up to fifty per cent of the federal policy space involves the execution of 
European regulations, and transposition of European directives (House of Commons Library 
2010). This implies that, under the practice of continuity of European commitments, many 
programmes in the federal policy space were guaranteed implementation during the political 
crisis. The Belgian Presidency of the Council of the European Union during the last half of 
2010 is another clear example of policy continuity under multi-level governance. As the 
preparations of this Presidency had started before the interregnum, it was considered to fall 
under the scope of current affairs. A whole apparatus of federal and regional civil servants 
specially recruited at both the regional and federal levels, and negotiating mechanisms 
supported by a highly reputed diplomatic corps, had paved the path on which the caretaker 
government could tread (Brans 2012). Despite the domestic challenges Belgium faced at the 
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time, its 2010 EU Presidency was considered a success, measured by its legislative and non-
legislative output. Ironically, the domestic problems contributed to this success. In some 
government departments, as we were told by our interviewees, there was frustration among 
civil servants about the lasting political crisis. The EU Presidency was a welcome distraction 
and created a lot of opportunities. Given the lost political legitimacy, the strategy was 
therefore also to focus on administrative, rather than political leadership in the Council 
(Beke, 2011). 
The division of powers largely averted the risk of complete government failure 
(Bouckaert and Brans 2012). The community and regional governments remained in full 
power during the political crisis at the federal level. This also applied to the EU Presidency. 
The collapse of the federal government did not stop the regional and community governments 
from having legitimised chairmanship over certain council formations, and guaranteeing 
continuity to a substantial degree (Beke, 2011). 
Moreover, when government action was needed, the supranational level promoted 
policy change, as seen with several instances whereby the European Union prompted action. 
The approval of a budget, unique in Belgian caretaker times, is one example. In addition, 
Belgium was required to submit a multi-annual budget for the reform programme Europe 
2020 and the Stability Pact.  The multilevel system thus inherently involves some checks and 
balances for government failure. The supranational level’s pressure for error correction was 
stronger than usual in the 2010-2011 political crisis, particularly because of the latter’s 
coincidence with the global financial crisis. Several of our observers agree that the financial 
crisis prompted policy change as well as accelerated the talks in forming a new government 
coalition. The credit downgradingstowards the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012, and the 
fearthat these would drive up Belgium’s borrowing costs, were major factors in compelling 
the conclusion of a government coalition (Stroobants et al, 2013: 7). From this, we dare to 
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posit that the global financial crisis, together with the EU’s vigilance forced Belgium’s hand 
in solving its political crisis. 
At the same time, it is clear that the multilevel system encumbers the strict application 
of the cautionary principle, underlying the rationale of caretaker conventions (Hooghe, 2012). 
Respecting international obligations is considered to be business as usual. The more 
international obligations, the more government action is inevitably needed during caretaker 
times. But  the distinction between the continuation of existing policy in the strict sense and 
the development of new policy initiatives is blurred.  Particularly in drafting multi-annual 
budgets and implementing EU directives the incidence of policy discretion and thus the 
opportunities for policy change are not unimaginable (Brans 2012).  
 
Permanence of political and administrative personnel 
Unlike in the US, the Belgian administration remains in place after new elections. The 
personnel factor is hence an important additional safeguard against policy termination during 
caretaker periods. This applies to administrative personnel both at the top and at lower levels. 
Managers at the apex of the federal administration are appointed on the basis of a mandate 
with a fixed term of 6 years, which exceeds the 4 years of a government term. The duration of 
civil servants’ contracts thus makes them less dependent on government cycles, and enables 
them to secure the continuous implementation of current policies. Yet, the long duration of 
the caretaker mode, and the lasting hold on new appointments, did attenuate this positive 
effect to some degree. Some government services had to make do with ‘interim managers’, 
whose appointments were put on hold during the caretaker period. Although the daily 
operations of these services were never threatened, interim managers missed the perceived 
legitimacy and authority to exert their powers to the full. For positions lower down the 
hierarchy, ministerial appointments were not needed. Their powers were not affected by the 
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caretaker mode. Neither did the fiscal crisis tremendously affect continuity in public service. 
Research among 61 organizations at central government level revealed that hiring freezes was 
the most common cutback measure in response to the fiscal crisis. In contrast, staff layoffs, 
pay cuts and pay freezes were rarely observed (Troupin et al. 2015: 18-19). 
Next to the administrative personnel, a majority of the ministers’ personal advisors 
remained in place during the political crisis. In the Belgian politico-administrative system, 
ministers are entitled to employ a ministerial cabinet, consisting of personal advisers who the 
minister appoints when taking office, and who do not belong to the administrative hierarchy. 
Belgian ministerial cabinets are relatively large by international standards  and have a 
considerable impact on Belgian policy-making (Brans et al. 2016). Their functions range 
from assisting the minister in identifying and formulating problems, to outlining policy, and 
assisting in everyday policy making. Usually, when government members exit, their personal 
advisors follow. The exodus from these ministerial cabinets during caretaker period was 
relatively limited. Our respondents in ministerial cabinets estimate that these interfaces were 
reduced to between fifty and eighty per cent of their normal occupancy. Ministers of the 
Liberal parties lost most advisors in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 elections, as the 
Liberals’ electoral loss initially made their return to power very unlikely. Also the nature of 
their recruitment and their  commitment to the public cause influenced the extent to which 
personal advisors remained in office. Civil servants on secondment in ministerial cabinets 
were reported not to be in a hurry as their return to employment in the administration was 
secured. By comparison, people recruited from outside the administration were more likely to 
leave. From our interviews, furthermore, it appeared that many top political advisors, such as 
the chiefs and vice-chiefs of ministerial cabinets remained there because of public service 
motivation or dedication to the public cause (Brans 2012).  
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Parliament’s action during caretaker times 
While the government negotiations lasted, the federal parliament convened. The caretaker 
rules did not restrict Parliament’s action, only the Executive’s. This time, parliamentary 
dynamics was not circumscribed by the compelling force of a coalition agreement, and in 
principle, it was also free from the majority-opposition logic.  
Traditionally, Belgium is characterized by a strong dominance of the executive over 
parliament. In normal times, parliamentary initiative is constrained by the executive in two 
ways. The coalition agreement determines the zone of influence of individual ministers and 
MPs alike. Second, parliamentary initiative is almost nil in regular times, controlled as it is by 
a majority-opposition logic and strong party discipline. New legislative initiatives rarely 
come from MPs, and when they do, they have to be first approved by the parties within the 
ruling coalition (Pilet 2012). Not restricted by any coalition agreement, parliamentary 
initiative during the last and longest caretaker period deviated from the usual (Van Aelst and 
Louwerse 2014).  
When it became apparent that the caretaker situation would not be over soon, not only urgent 
draft legislation initiated by the caretaker government itself was voted , but also a 
considerable number of parliamentary proposals were initiated (n=2100) and voted (n=67) 
(Gaukema 2012). Interestingly, while the incumbent caretaker coalition still had a majority in 
the two chambers, the voting behaviour revealed no dominant pattern of coalition building. 
Some issues were indeed voted on along the lines of the caretaker government composition, 
other votes involved parties coalescing along other cleavages (left/right; 
Francophone/Flemish) or they involved opposition parties that were partners in the 
negotiations. Some issues, such as the participation in the war effort against Libya, were even 
voted with exceptional unanimity. Two qualifications should be made here. First, despite the 
caretaker mode, parties remained extremely cohesive. Vote dissention was still unusual, 
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given the system of strong party discipline of Belgian politics (Pilet 2012). Secondly, as our 
interviewees confirmed, several of the parliamentary initiatives masked initiatives of the 
caretaker coalition. In normal times too, executives may resort to parliamentary initiative to 
avert criticism or buy time (Swenden 2004). When the Belgian caretaker government resorted 
to Parliament, it was to win time, given the uncertain duration of the government formation, 
and fend off criticism of breaching care-taker breaks on policy innovation. 
At any rate, it is clear that the caretaker period made room for a reinvention of 
parliamentary dynamics, and created more leeway for parliamentary initiative. A year and a 
half later, however, parliamentary dynamics appeared to have returned to its former vitality 
(Van Aelst and Louwerse 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
In their comparative analysis of fiscal consolidation policies in Europe, Kickert et al. (2013) 
classified Belgium in the cluster of continental European countries where the economic crisis 
was met by relatively moderate economic recovery packages. In these countries, cutback 
decisions were postponed until after the general elections, and thus coincided with multi-
party coalition negotiations. In Germany, the coalition was swiftly formed, while in the 
Netherlands coalition formation took about four months. In Belgium, postponing cutback 
decisions until after the elections proved a serious leap into the dark.   
The 2010 federal elections in Belgium had marked the growing divergence between the two 
regions. Two parties, the conservative Flemish Nationalists and the Walloon Socialists, were 
the uncontested winners in an otherwise fragmented party landscape. Their opposing views 
on the reform of the federation and on vital socio-economic matters produced the most 
difficult and long lasting government formation process in Belgian history. In 541 days 
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absence of a duly appointed government, the federal level was governed by a caretaker 
government, exactly at the time when the financial crisis ravaged the Eurozone.  
In this contribution, we have approached the Belgian case as a unique research case 
for investigating how and to what extent policy continuity and change took shape in times of 
a double crisis. We found that the caretaker government conventions themselves provide 
guarantees for preventing policy termination and allow for a variation of policy changes. The 
loose formalisation of caretaker rules enabled the caretaker government to stretch the 
cautionary principles of continuity and urgency to the extent that dysfunctional ruptures in 
government programmes were dodged and yet pressing domestic and international matters 
were addressed. The exogenous financial crisis together with the duration of the endogenous 
political crisis enlarged the number of policy decisions to be considered urgent, thus requiring 
a caretaker government response beyond what is usually the remit in better economic times.  
At the same time, the budgetary guarantees prevented government services shutdown, while 
unintentionally leading to modest savings across the board, which fortuitously contributed to 
fiscal consolidation.  
As we recently witness longer government formation in Europe, including 
Westminster systems, (Louwerse and Van Aelst 2013: 5), countries can draw positive lessons 
from the Belgian case. Next to the flexible content of caretaker conventions themselves, we 
observed three more conditions that provide grounds for positive institutional lesson-drawing 
on policy continuity and change in times of crisis. First, the nature of the multi-level system 
of governing Belgium proved robust in times of double crisis. Below the federal level, 
regions and communities provided policy continuity and innovation in the many domains 
over which they have exclusive competences. Above the national level, the EU stepped in, 
and promoted policy changes in response to the falling credit ratings, leading, amongst other 
decisions, to the Belgian Parliament voting on a budget, which had so far been unseen in the 
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history of caretaker government. Second, the nature of the Belgian civil service system, in 
which public managers (and ministerial advisors for that matter), remain in place when the 
governing coalition changes, is conducive for guaranteeing the continuity of government 
operations. While it is true that the caretaker control over appointments did in some cases 
weaken the leadership of the administrative top as well as frustrated many a civil servant, this 
did not prevent them from keeping government services running and from contributing to a 
successful EU Presidency in 2010. Thirdly, our analysis has highlighted the importance of 
parliamentary initiative. In parliamentary democracies, legislative initiative is nowadays 
dominated by the executive. The long absence of a duly mandated executive in Belgium has 
demonstrated how the re-constellation of members of Parliament beyond the usual minority-
majority divide, helped to substitute the executive for the much needed legal initiatives and 
policy change. The explanatory power of the nature of multi-level governance, the 
permanence of the administration, and the re-constellation of parliament calls for further 
comparative analysis. Our single case analysis suggests that strong devolution, an 
independent civil service, and a weak parliament able to re-invent itself into a stronger one, 
provide checks and balances needed when the central executive fails. 
Apart from explaining our single case, our analysis has also something to say about 
exogenous drivers of policy change. Our analysis has confirmed the importance of 
international determinants of policy change. The exogenous crisis was strong enough to 
overrule the political crisis, and induce error corrections a caretaker government would 
normally not engage in. Yet, when looking at the components of policy change, as Howlett 
and Cashore suggest (2009), we found that the extent of exogenously induced policy change 
was still to a large extent mitigated by the caretaker rule. While the literature suggests that 
exogenous factors of the gravity presented by the Eurozone crisis induce third order change, 
most changes in our case were first and second order changes (Hall 1993, quoted in Howlett 
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and Cahore 2009), and did not extend beyond the calibration of policy instruments. It was 
only after a government was duly appointed that policy change moved to priority setting, 
targeted cutbacks, and innovation of objectives.  
 
This article analysed how a single caretaker government took care of crisis. To 
broaden the comparative analysis of policy-making in times of crisis, future research could 
comparatively analyse policy-making under different caretaker governments. And if the 
recent trend to longer government formation in Europe persists, the population of candidate 
countries for such a comparison will only expand. Another suggestion for future research is 
to analyse how and with what effect policy responses to crisis vary with the remit of 
government. Caretaker and technocratic governments have essentially different mandates for 
change, and it would thus be a fruitful avenue to compare their policy responses to similar 
crises. 
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